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Bankruptcy - Tax Discharge - Tax Priority
Taxpayer, a corporation, filed income tax returns for its fiscal years
1957, 1958, and 1959, which disclosed questions concerning deductions
claimed and the treatment of various income items. The Internal Revenue
Service had undertaken routine administrative adjustment procedures, but
had given no notice of deficiency' nor made any assessment of taxes' for
the years in question prior to the taxpayer's adjudication of bankruptcy in
1965. The United States claimed priority status for these taxes under sec-
tion 64a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act,' but the trustee in bankruptcy ob-
jected, contending that the taxes were dischargeable debts under section
17a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act," and, therefore, not entitled to priority
status. The referee in bankruptcy and the district court sustained the ob-
jection and allowed discharge in bankruptcy of the tax liability. Held, re-
versed and remanded: The taxes are entitled to priority status and are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy, even though they are over three years old, for
two reasons: (1) they were not reported on a return made by the bank-
rupt; and (2) they were not assessed prior to bankruptcy by reason of
a prohibition on assessment pending the exhaustion of administrative or
judicial remedies available to the bankrupt. In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc.,
428 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
I. COMPELLING REASONS FOR 1966 AMENDMENTS TO THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
The fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938' is twofold:
first, it provides a means for the effective rehabilitation of the bankrupt;
and second, it provides a means for the equitable distribution of the bank-
rupt's assets among his creditors.' Generally, a debtor's basic objective in
filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy is to obtain a discharge from
his provable debts' in order to gain a new start free from obligations and
responsibilities resulting from past business misfortunes.! However, prior
'TNT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 6212.
2id. § 6201 (a) (1).
8 Bankruptcy Act S 64a(4), 11 U.S.C.A. 5 104(a) (4) (Supp. 1971), which reads in part:
"The debts to have priority . . . and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates . . . shall be
(4) taxes which become legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States . . .
which are not released by a discharge in bankruptcy."
"Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C.A. 5 35(a) (Supp. 1971), which reads in part:
(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as (1) are taxes which be-
came legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State or
any subdivision thereof within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided however,
that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes . . .
(c) which were not reported on a return made by the bankrupt and which were not
assessed prior to bankruptcy by reason of a prohibition on assessment pending the
exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies available to the bankrupt.
'Chandler Act § 1-404, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §5 1869-1935
(1964).
6S. REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reported in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2468 (1966).7 Dilworth v. Boothe, 69 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1934).
'Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898," all debts and taxes due to the United
States and to the states, although not specially excepted from discharge by
statute, were held not dischargeable in bankruptcy."0 The Act of 1898,
which specifically excepted taxes from discharge," was interpreted to mean
that any other debts not specifically excepted were dischargeable. Taxes
were denied dischargeability because it was not thought fitting that one
should be able to avoid tax liability by going through bankruptcy. In
addition, the Government was accorded priority status for payment of
taxes in advance of payment to general unsecured creditors.'
As tax liability became more burdensome in modern times, the conflict
between the desire to protect the public purse and creditors, and the need
to aid the rehabilitation of the bankrupt became acute. Accumulation of
back taxes, which was often unknown to creditors, frequently exhausted
the assets of a bankrupt estate because of the priority status. Furthermore,
an inequity arose when the bankrupt was an individual rather than a cor-
poration. Corporations could go bankrupt without any surviving tax lia-
bility on their shareholders beyond that of their interest in the corpora-
tion, but individuals remained burdened with unsatisfied tax liabilities
which adversely affected their rehabilitation.1 For these reasons section
17a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938' e was amended to limit, subject
to exceptions, non-dischargeability of taxes to those taxes becoming
"legally due and owing""' within three years preceding bankruptcy."
Thus, taxes accruing prior to three years before bankruptcy, subject to
the exceptions, were made dischargeable in an attempt to mitigate the
build-up of enormous tax debts on individuals over long periods.
II. EXCEPTION (c) TO DISCHARGE OF TAX LIABILITY
As noted above, there are exceptions to the dischargeability of tax debts
9 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544; see 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 5 17.13 (14th
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; Plumb, Federal Tax Liens and Priorities in Bankruptcy-
Recent Developments, 43 REP. J. 37 (1969).
aoSee, e.g., United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 251 (1873) (debt due United States);
State v. Shelton, 47 Conn. 400 (1873) (debt due state); COLLIER 3 17.13.
"Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 35(a) (Supp. 1971).
"2See COLLIER 5 17.13 n.12.
'Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964).
4 Chandler Act § 64a(4), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. 5
104(a)(4) (Supp. 1971).
15S. REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966), reported in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2468-69 (1966); Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966,
42 WASH. L. REV. 681, 710 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Marsh]. Marsh states the inequity applied
only to individuals in a business or profession and not to the wage earner on account of the with-
holding provisions of the IRC which make it doubtful that any unpaid taxes are of any real sig-
nificance. Id. at 731. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77
YALE L.J. 228, 262 (1968).
1SChandler Act S 17a(1), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. 5
35(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
17 The exact date to which the phrase refers has generated considerable controversy. COLLIER
17.14[11] notes that it had no established meaning in federal tax law as of the time of the 1966
amendments. He maintains that several dates could logically be utilized, but that the simplest
standard is the date when the tax return is due, which is the position the Government takes. See
also Marsh 684-88, 694 n.35; Plumb, supra note 15, at 264.




"legally due and owing" more than three years prior to bankruptcy. At
least one writer" has suggested that the most important exception of the
1966 amendment is exception (c), ° which provides that taxes are not
dischargeable "which were not reported on a return made by the bank-
rupt and which were not assessed prior to bankruptcy by reason of a
prohibition on assessment pending the exhaustion of administrative or
judicial remedies available to the bankrupt."" The exception is relevant
only to those taxes due more than three years prior to bankruptcy.
There are two conditions that must be met before exception (c) applies.
The first is that the taxes were "not reported on a return '  of the bank-
rupt, and the second is that those taxes were "not assessed prior to bank-
ruptcy by reason of a prohibition on assessment pending the exhaustion of
administrative or judicial remedies available to the bankrupt."' As to the
first condition, a distinction exists between tax liability not reported based
on information on the return, and information not reported which would
give rise to tax liability."4 Apparently, if the latter has occurred, the excep-
tion is inapplicable, although other exceptions may operate to deny dis-
chargeability.' The second condition also requires interpretation. The key
to its meaning is the phrase "prohibition on assessment," which refers to
section 6213 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.' Because of this section,
assessment is prohibited: (1) until notice of deficiency (commonly called
the ninety-day letter) is sent to the taxpayer, and a ninety-day period has
lapsed if no petition is filed in the Tax Court; or (2) until decision of the
Tax Court is final if a petition has been filed." The "prohibition on assess-
ment" does not mean a total prohibition since the possibility of jeopardy
assessment under Internal Revenue Code section 6861 always exists. Thus,
in essence, a total prohibition under Internal Revenue Code section
6213 (a) never exists. If total prohibition were a requirement of exception
(c), it would be meaningless.'
"See Plumb, supra note 15, at 266; Plumb, supra note 9, at 43, 44.2011 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (1) (c) (Supp. 1971); see note 4 supra.
" Id. (emphasis added).
22 Id.
25 Id.
24 See In re Cohen, 68-1 U.S. Tax. Cas,. 9250 (Ref. N.D. Ga. 1967); COLLIER 5 17.14[4].
2SE.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (1) (d) (Supp. 1971) (fraudulent return).
21 Marsh 692. This section stated in full is as follows:
Time for filing petition and restriction on assessment.-Within 90 days, or 150 days
if the notice is addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and the District
of Columbia, after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not
counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the
last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination
of the deficiency. Except as otherwise provided in section 6861 no assessment of a
deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A or B [or chapter 42] and no
levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted
until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such
90-day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if a petition has been filed with
the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 7421 (a), the making of such assessment or the beginning of
such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined
by a proceeding in the proper court.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6213(a).
" Decision of the Tax Court is not final until the appellate process has been completed. INT.




One writer" contends the only taxes saved from discharge by exception
(c) are those for which administrative remedies are "pending" at the
date the petition of bankruptcy is filed. Others have rejected that theory
in noting that exception (c) does not refer to "pending administrative
remedies," but rather to "pending the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies." ' Hence, any unassessed tax prohibited from assessment by Internal
Revenue Code section 6213 (a) is not dischargeable, no matter how old the
liability may be."' The moment the prohibition on assessment has ceased-
when ninety days have lapsed after notice of deficiency and no petition
has been filed in Tax Court, or when a petition is filed in Tax Court and
its decision has become final-the exception no longer applies. If the
bankruptcy petition is filed before that moment, the tax liability is not dis-
chargeable. However, if the bankruptcy petition is filed after that moment
but before assessment is made and other necessary protection procedures'
are taken by the Government, the tax liability is dischargeable.'
III. IN RE INDIAN LAKE ESTATES, INC.
In In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc." the Fifth Circuit court of appeals
thoroughly examined the legislative history of the 1966 amendment allow-
ing dischargeability but could find no guidelines as to the meaning and
purpose of exception (c). The court acknowledged the twofold purpose'
for permitting dischargeability of tax liability, but stated that considera-
tion of those purposes was meaningless in interpreting exception (c).'
Although the taxpayer going bankrupt was a corporation, the decision
would not have been different had the taxpayer been an individual where
the equity of dischargeability is stronger. The meaning of exception (c)
was too obvious for the court to decide otherwise. This was true even when
considering what was in effect a "secret" tax lien on the taxpayer's prop-
erty, about which creditors would likely have no knowledge and which
would adversely affect any distribution of assets to them. The court faced
a dilemma in applying exception (c), which was in direct conflict with
the broad purposes of the statute. It appeared no other choice was available
but that the plain meaning of exception (c) should prevail.
Indian Lake Estates involves a clear example of congressional recognition
of an inequitable situation and an attempt to rectify the problem by
amending existing law. The amendment, however, stopped short of the
"Lurvey, Tax Discharge in Bankruptcy: How the New Rules Work; Difficulty in Tax Plan-
ning, 28 J. TAX. 242 (1968).
30 Marsh 692; Plumb, supra note 9, at 44.
31 However, this is not an absolute rule. If the deficiency arose from a non-fraudulent return
and the Government has taken no steps to assess or collect it or to secure a waiver of limitations,
INT. Ruv. CoDE of 1954, S 6501 (a), proscribes assessment of such taxes when 3 years have lapsed
from the time the return was filed.
32Necessary procedure is outlined in S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966), re-
ported in U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2442-43 (1966); Marsh 693. Once prohibition on assess-
ment has ceased, the Government has 60 days in which to make an assessment. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 603 (a) (1).
' Plumb, supra note 9, at 44.
"428 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
35 Id. at 322; see note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
s 4 2 8 F.2d at 323.
1971]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
desired policy change as it included exception (c). The practical result is
that pre-1966 law denying dischargeability has changed little. The court's
interpretation is significant only in that it recognizes the opinions by
various writers that the 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act failed
to effect a change in policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the prohibition of Internal Revenue Code section 6213 (a) exists as
specified within section 17a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act,"' no federal income
tax claims will be denied priority except: (1) taxes assessed prior to bank-
ruptcy for which no lien notice has been filed; and (2) taxes against
which the prohibition has expired but the petition of bankruptcy has
been filed before assessment can be made. The first exception can be elimi-
nated by the Internal Revenue Service sending a demand and filing a notice
of tax lien simultaneously with assessment. The second can be eliminated
by the Internal Revenue Service speeding up its assessment procedures upon
termination of the prohibition.' Thus, the Government can preserve its
priority status in virtually all cases. General unsecured creditors will not
receive any more in bankruptcy liquidations than before, nor will the
bankrupt be appreciably helped in his rehabilitation. Probably the only
way to eliminate the ambiguities of section 17a(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act and more effectively implement the policies intended by Congress is
by new amendments. W. T. Plumb, Jr., has offered a model amendment
to that section, which he suggests would alleviate its ambiguities without
altering the policy decisions of Congress. Exception (c) would be altered
to read "that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from
any taxes.., which were not reported on a return made by the bankrupt
and were not assessed prior to bankruptcy."' Omitted is the requirement
that the failure to assess be "by reason of a prohibition on assessment pend-
ing the exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies available to the
bankrupt."41 The suggestion would make dischargeability dependent not
upon the prohibition of Internal Revenue Code section 6213 (a), but only
upon the assessment prior to bankruptcy. This is more nearly in accord
with the policy reasons for enacting the 1966 amendments.
T. E. Fry
37Il U.S.C.A. § 3 1 (a) (1) (c) (Supp. 1971).
"8 See Marsh 696-97.
" 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (1) (Supp. 1971).
40 Plumb, supra note 9, at 45-46.41 Id. at 46 n.146.
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